第162回「制度と組織の経済学」研究会 (共催：IPP研究会）

日時:　2024年7月19日（金）13:30 ～ 15:00
場所:    大阪大学 豊中キャンパス 国際公共政策研究科（OSIPP）棟 2階 講義シアター（会場が変更になりました）
申込:　[encode]yuri-kitabayashi@iss.u-tokyo.ac.jp[/encode]（東京大学中林研究室 北林様宛)
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Presenter:
石田潤一郎氏（大阪大学 社会経済研究所）

Title: “Optimal Feedback Dynamics Against Free-Riding in Collective Experimentation“
　　   (with Chia-Hui Chen, Hulya Eraslan and Takuro Yamashita)

[su_quote cite=”Abstract: Junichiro Ishida”] We consider a dynamic model in which a principal decides what information to release about a product of unknown quality (e.g., a vaccine) to incentivize agents to experiment with the product. Assuming that the agents are long-lived and forward-looking, their incentive to wait and see other agents’ experiences poses a significant obstacle to social learning. We show that the optimal feedback mechanism to mitigate information free-riding takes a strikingly simple form: the principal recommends adoption as long as she observes no bad news, but only with some probability; once she does not recommend at some point, she stays silent forever after that. Our analysis suggests the optimality of premature termination, which in turn implies that: (i) false positives (termination in the good state) are more acceptable than false negatives (continuation in the bad state); (ii) overly cautious mechanisms that are biased toward termination can be welfare-enhancing. [/su_quote]

• 共催：東京大学社会科学研究所 & IPP研究会
• 問合せ：東京大学社会科学研究所  中林真幸研究室